The EU or National Reform Program for Turkey: Does the Political Feasibility Depend on the EU's Absorption Capacity? by Hasan Ersel & Fatih Ozatay
 
 
The EU or National Reform Program for Turkey: Does the Political 














Department of Economics 






Working Paper No: 09-02 
TOBB University of Economics and Technology 













 TOBB University of Economics and Technology Department of Economics Working Papers are published without a formal 
refereeing process, with the sole purpose of generating discussion and feedback.  
 The EU or national reform program for Turkey: does the political 
feasibility depend on the EU’s absorption capacity?1 
 
 
Hasan Ersel* and Fatih Özatay** 
*  Sabancı University, Turkey. E-mail: hasanersel@sabanciuniv.edu 
** TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Turkey. E-mail: fatih.ozatay@etu.edu.tr 
 
Abstract 
Concerns  of  the  EU  countries  on  Turkey’s  membership  are  summarized  by  the  term  ‘EU’s 
absorption capacity’. This implies that Turkey may end up as a member of the EU or may not. Even 
the reform process can abruptly come to an end due to reasons irrespective of the performance of 
Turkey. In a two-sector model, we show that despite this uncertainty, if before the start of the 
reform  program  a  ‘no’  is  perceived  as  less  likely,  the  EU-reform  will  be  supported  ex-ante. 
However, a ‘no’ at the midst of the EU reform program can block the reform process ex-post, since 
both of the sectors suddenly find themselves in a position that they should have not accepted 
beforehand. Moreover, such a situation can render continuing with the alternative national reform 
program very hard. On the contrary, if the probability of a ‘yes’ is ex-ante perceived as less likely, 
the traditional sector opposes the EU reform process. However, if this perception is wrong and the 
true probability of a ‘yes’ is high, a reform program which if implemented would have been in the 
interests of both of the sectors ex-post, will not be implemented. 
JEL classifications: D72, O10, O19. 




                                            
1 Earlier versions of this paper  were presented at the ‘Modernization  of Economy and  Social 
Development’ conference organized by Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia, April 2007 
and  at  the  Economic  Research  Forum  15th  Annual  Conference  on  ‘Equity  and  Economic 
Development’, Cairo, Egypt, November 2008. We thank our discussants and the participants of 
the conferences for helpful comments. Any errors are our own. 1  
1.  Introduction  
In the December 2004 meeting of the European Council, the European Union (EU) decided to 
launch negotiations with Turkey to establish a timetable for accession. The EU and Turkey agreed 
that the negotiations are open ended, i.e., even if Turkey satisfies all the necessary conditions for 
EU membership, the EU may still have an option of not accepting her membership. The concerns 
of the EU countries on Turkey’s membership are aggregated under the term ‘EU’s absorption 
capacity’, which combines factors ranging from psychological ones such as the prejudices against 
Turkey to more rational ones such as the concerns over the Turkish economy’s development level 
and its size. In any case, this implies that at the end of the negotiation process, the outcome may 
be one of the two qualitatively very different states: Turkey may end up as a member of the EU or 
may not. Even the negotiation process can abruptly come to an end due to reasons irrespective of 
the performance of Turkey.  
Clearly,  “EU’s  absorption  capacity”  type  arguments  create  uncertainty  regarding  the 
Turkey’s membership to the EU.2 The natural questions then arise are the following: What is the 
                                            
2  For  example,  on  December  15,  2008,  at  8  pm,  searching  for  “Membership  of  Turkey  EU 
Sarkozy or Merkel” on Google gave 92700 results. Just four examples from the first ten results 
explicitly document this uncertainty: 
1) “Sarkozy blocks key part of EU entry talks on Turkey” (International Herald Tribune, 
June 25, 2007; http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/25/news/union.php). 
Two months later: 2) “French President Nicolas Sarkozy has softened his stance towards 
Turkey, saying that he would not block negotiations between Ankara and the European Union, 
despite  his  long  opposition  to the  country's  accession”  (EURACTIVE  NETWORK,  August  28, 
2007;http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/sarkozy-softens-opposition-turkey-eu-
membership/article-166184). 
3) “Signaling a subtle shift in her policy toward Turkey just weeks before Germany takes 
over the European Union presidency on Jan. 1, Chancellor Angela Merkel indicated Thursday 
that she supported its eventual membership” (International Herald Tribune, December 14, 2006; 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/25/news/union.php). 
A year later: 4) “German Chancellor Angela Merkel reiterated on Monday that she and 
her conservative party were opposed to Turkey being granted full membership of the European 
Union” (EUBusiness, December 4, 2007; http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1196695023.39/). 
This paragraph is from the International Crisis Group Report (2008, pp.4): “Paradoxically, 
the slowdown in reforms coincided with the opening of EU membership negotiations. This was 2  
impact of this uncertainty on the Turkish citizens’ support for the EU reform program? Under which 
conditions should Turkey continue with the EU reform program instead of reforming the economy 
according  to  its  own  agenda  (national  reform  program)?  Our  basic  aim  is  to  answer  these 
questions.3 
The effects of various types of uncertainties on reform programs are well documented in 
the literature on political economy of reforms. For example, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show 
that, if some of the gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified ex-ante, such reforms will 
lack political support to be implemented. However, should these reforms were adopted they would 
have received adequate political support. Under these conditions, Wei (1997) emphasizes that a 
gradual reform strategy will help to overcome resistance to the reform. Wyplosz (1993) shows that 
the transition phase is  difficult: it is certain that some workers will lose from  an economically 
efficient reform4, but there is an uncertainty regarding who will be affected. Once a reform is 
implemented, unemployment emerges and since who is unemployed is known by certainty, political 
difficulties emerge and the continuation of reform can be in jeopardy.5  
This paper differs from the literature by focusing entirely on uncertainties stemming from 
the ’EU’s absorption capacity’ type arguments regarding the Turkey’s membership to the EU. We 
                                                                                                                                  
partially  caused  by  a  growing  sense  of  disappointment and  frustration  with  Europe as  senior 
leaders began to raise their voices against membership. In her 2005 election campaign, German 
Chancellor  Angela  Merkel  called  for  the  goal  of  negotiations  to  be  downgraded  to  privileged 
partnership. French President Nicolas Sarkozy made opposition to membership a major plank of 
his  2007  campaign  and  tried  to  remove  references  to  Turkey’s  “accession”  from  any  EU 
statements. Turkish public support for membership dropped from 65 per cent in 2002 to 49 per 
cent in 2008.”   
3 For the purpose of this paper a reform program is defined as “politically feasible” if it Pareto 
dominates status quo, i.e. if it is acceptable for both sectors. In a previous paper we analyzed the 
feasibility of reform in a two-party policy choice game. Under certain conditions specified in the 
paper we showed that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium at which both parties choose not 
to change the status quo (Ersel and Özatay, 2007). 
4 See Appendix A for the characterization of the economically efficient reform. 
5 For a critical survey of this literature, see for example, Agenor (2004, Chapters 14 and 17) and 
Roland (2000, Chapter 2). 3  
do  not  consider  the  types  of  uncertainties  discussed  in  the  literature  on  political  economy  of 
reforms. In our model, in the absence of uncertainties stemming from the EU’s absorption capacity, 
provided  that  some  acceptability  conditions  are  met,  everybody  will  gain  from  the  EU  reform 
program which dominates the national reform alternative. More importantly, in a two-sector model, 
we  show  that  despite  these  uncertainties,  if  before  the  start  of  the  reform  program  a  ‘no’  is 
perceived as less likely, the EU-reform is ex-ante acceptable. However, a ‘no’ during the reform 
phase can block the reform process ex-post, since both of the sectors suddenly find themselves in 
a position that they should have not preferred ex-ante. Moreover, such a situation by decreasing 
the political strength of the incumbent can jeopardize continuation with the alternative national 
reform program.6 Then the only remaining option for the policy makers is going back to the status 
quo. This is a clear loss of (potential) welfare for people living in both sectors, since instead of the 
EU reform program the government could have chosen the national reform program alternative at 
the outset. On the contrary, if the probability of a ‘yes’ is ex-ante perceived as less likely, the 
traditional sector opposes the EU reform process. However, if this perception is wrong and the true 
probability of a ‘yes’ is high, a reform program which if implemented would have been in the 
interests of both of the sectors ex-post, will not be implemented. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the following section we set our model and then 
discuss the basics of the EU and national reform programs. The national reform program has 
important differences than the EU program. First of all, the positive externality created through the 
EU membership is no longer available. Second, given the absence of this externality, in order to 
decrease  burden  of  the  reform,  reformers  can  choose to follow  a program  that  aims  partially 
restructuring the traditional sector, which was not an option in the EU program. Third, there is no 
                                            
6 The mechanism which may lead to this result is not discussed. 4  
uncertainty regarding the decision of the EU. The third section briefly discusses two alternative 
schemes to finance the burden of reforms. While other alternative schemes can be designed, it 
suffices to consider only two schemes to show the impact of the ‘EU’s absorption capacity’ type 
arguments  on  the  acceptability  of  the  reform  programs.  The  fourth  section  provides  the 
acceptability conditions under the EU reform program for the debt financing case. We also discuss 
whether the conditions for the traditional and modern sectors7 are mutually compatible. The fifth 
section  documents  similar  conditions  for  the  national  reform  program.  In  the  sixth  section  we 
discuss  under  which  conditions  the  EU  reform  program  is  preferable  to  the  national  reform 
alternative. The seventh section is for the tax financing case. The final section concludes.  
2. The model 
We  consider  a  two-sector,  two-period  economy.  The  sectors  are  labeled  as  modern  (M)  and 
traditional (T). The modern sector is assumed to have the capacity of adjusting itself to the EU 
production standards and institutional norms, or for the sake of simplicity, it has already adjusted. 
Traditional sector, on the other hand, can only adjust itself to the EU standards and norms after a 
major  and  costly  restructuring.  Therefore  people  affiliated  with  these  sectors  have  different 
concerns  and  therefore  different  attitudes  concerning  economic  reform  programs.  These 
differences are assumed to be reflected in their ‘acceptability conditions” The first period8 (t=1) is 
the reform period. Both sectors produce the same output, but employ different technologies. The 
total output of the modern sector is as follows: 
λ θ t M t M Y , , =                            (1) 
                                            
7 In this paper the term “sector” stands for “people affiliated with the sector”.  
8  The  length  of  the  first  period  depends  on  time  required  for  relocating  and  training  of  ex-
traditional sector people.  5  
where θM,t is a productivity variable which is a function of technology, human capital and the 
institutional structure prevailing at the beginning of period t in the modern sector,  λ is the share of 
total labor supply employed in the modern sector. Total labor supply is assumed to be fixed and is 
normalized to L=1.   
The traditional sector, on the other hand has the following production function:  
) 1 ( , , λ θ − = t T t T Y .                         (2) 
By construction, the productivity level in the modern sector is greater than that of the traditional 
sector: 
1   ; , , > = α αθ θ t T t M .                             (3)   
2.1 The EU reform program 
The  EU  reform  program  envisages  two  reforms.  The  first  reform  is  the  modernization  of  the 
economy by the full application of the EU norms (for example environmental standards) in the 
production.  This  necessitates  ceasing  the  production  activity  in  the  traditional  sector  and 
transferring the labor of this sector to the modern sector. This transfer can only be accomplished by 
raising the skill level of the labor force of the traditional sector. This requires investment in human 
capital. Suppose that this activity costs c (c>0) per employee transferred. It is assumed that during 
the transition period, workers in the traditional sector become unemployed. The second reform 
focuses  on  the  labor  market.  Modern  labor  market  institutions  should  cover  all  unemployed. 
Therefore those  who  are  unemployed should  be  compensated  according  to  “EU  norms”.  The 
unemployment benefit per unemployed is η (η>0). All of the reforms are completed in the first 
period and the economy starts to the second period with the modern sector only, which now also 6  
covers the transformed pre-reform traditional sector. This means that λ=1 at the end of the reform 
process. 
The  traditional  sector  is  not  able  to  finance  the  expenditures  necessary  for  the 
transformation,  i.e.  human  capital  investment  and  unemployment  compensation.  This  is 
undertaken by the government in the first period. The amount of government expenditure for such 
a transformation is 
) 1 )( ( 1 λ η − + = c G
EU ,                    (4) 
where  the  superscript  EU  stands  for  the  EU  program.  This  expenditure  is  financed  through 
alternative schemes which are discussed in the third section. 
If Turkey joins to the EU, it is expected that the country will enjoy some extra benefits from 
being in the union, for example due to better access to international markets, lower transaction 
costs and the implied gains from trade. Let z denote per capita extra benefit from accession (z>0). 
The ‘EU’s absorption capacity’ type arguments, on the other hand, create uncertainty regarding the 
Turkey’s membership to the EU. It is assumed that even in the first (reform) period, there is such a 
probability  (
EU q1 1− ).  Note  that  the  abandoning  the  traditional  mode  of  production  and  the 
selection of the financing structure occurs at the beginning of the first period, before observing the 
decision of the EU. If a sudden stop due to the EU’s decision realizes, there are two possibilities in 
front of the reformers: either switching to the national reform program, or turning back to the status 
quo. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the latter option is costless. Let the probability of 7  
choosing the national  reform alternative  be 
N q1 .9 If there is not any sudden stop, the  reform 
process is completed in the first period, at the end of which the EU gives its final decision. The 
probability of receiving a ‘yes’ from the EU is 
EU q2 . The timing of events is shown in Table 1 and 
EU’s reactions are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Table 1: The Timing of Reforms and Events in the EU Reform Program 
     
      YT is abandoned and 
      financing scheme is 
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Figure 1. Illustration of EU’s Reactions and Time Periods 
                                            
9 Since  1 0 1 ≤ ≤
N q , this is more general than setting-up the model without the alternative of 
switching to the national reform program. In what follows, we will discuss how our results change 
if  0 1 =
N q . 8  
2.2 The national reform program 
The political economy of the national reform program is completely different from the EU reform 
case. First of all, the extra benefit created through the EU membership is no longer available (z=0). 
Second, the EU decision concerning Turkey’s accession becomes irrelevant and therefore it does 
not create any uncertainty. Third, the reformers may opt to a more gradual reform strategy or a 
partial reform program while keeping the length of the reform process intact. 
The  partial  restructuring  strategy  may  also  create  its  own  uncertainty.  For  example, 
consider a situation where only a part of the production in the traditional sector is terminated. 
Suppose that which part of the traditional sector will be subjected to transformation is not known a-
priori by the public. Under this situation ex-ante and ex-post acceptability conditions of the national 
reform program will be different.10 In what follows we will abstract from this uncertainty but keep the 
partial reform advantage of the national reform process by assuming that working hours of the 
traditional sector is restricted.11 This effectively means that 
N δ of the labor force ( 1 0 ≤ <
N δ ) of 
the traditional sector becomes unemployed due to the national reform program and subject to 
human  capital  increasing  training  program.12  The  superscript  N  is  for  the  national  program. 
Consequently, the necessary government expenditure for the transformation of a portion of the 
labor force of the traditional sector to the modern sector is 
) 1 )( ( 1 λ η δ − + = c G
N N .                    (5) 
                                            
10 However, similar set-ups are designed by various researchers: for example, Fernandez and 
Rodrik  (1991,  pp.1146)  concludes  “that  there  are  reforms  which,  once  adopted,  will  receive 
adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante”. See also Wyplosz 
(1993) and Wei (1997). 
11  The  reason  that  we  do  not  model  such  an  uncertainty  is  that  we  want  to  focus  on  the 
uncertainty surrounding the EU reform process only. 
12  The  introduction  of  the  partial  reform  strategy  as  an  option  is  not  only  for  the  sake  of 
completeness. Such a strategy may be appealing for a government that wishes to reduce the 
burden of the transformation on the existing generation.  Note that if  1 =
N δ  then we have a full 
national reform as in the EU alternative. 9  
3. Alternative financing schemes 
It suffices to consider two alternative financing schemes to show the impact of the ‘EU’s absorption 
capacity’ type arguments on the acceptability of the reform programs: debt and tax financing. 
3.1 Debt financing 
In  both  of  the  reform  programs,  at  the  beginning  of  the  reform  period  (t=1),  the  government 
introduces  a  borrowing  (saving)  scheme  for  the  modern  sector  to  finance  the  necessary 
government expenditures given by Equation (4) for the EU reform program and by Equation (5) for 
the national reform program: 
N EU j B M
j
M
j   ,   ; 1 , 1 = = λ θ γ                        (6) 
where 
j B1  is the real value of debt issued by the government at the start of the reform period. 
Using Equations (4), (5) and (6), one obtains the required saving rates of the modern sector for 
both of the reform alternatives as13  
1 0   ; 1   ;   ,   ;
) 1 )( ( N EU










M .                     (7) 
The real interest rate on the debt is r*. The debt is repaid at the beginning of the second 
period  by  taxing  the  ex-traditional  sector.  Showing  the  gross  real  interest  rate  factor  by  R* 
(R*=1+r*), the value of the tax (TX) that should be paid by each person in the ex-traditional sector 
at the beginning of the second period is 















.                (8) 
 
 
                                            
13  An  institutional  assumption  that  leads  to  this  result  may  be  as  follows:  The  government 
determines its borrowing requirement, and leaves the market interest to adjust until it attracts 
sufficient savings. 10   
3.2 Tax financing 
In  the  EU  reform  program,  the  government  expenditure  that  is  necessary  to  transform  the 
traditional sector is financed by taxing the modern sector at the beginning of the first period, before 
observing any decision from the EU. Noting that  1
EU = δ  and replacing 
j
M 1 , γ  in Equation (7) by 
the required tax rate (
EU







c ) 1 )( (
1 ,
− +
= .                       (9) 
Note that, as is discussed below, under national reform program, since the modern sector 
is not compensated in the second period (z=0), the tax financing scheme is not supported by the 
modern sector. 
4. Political feasibility of the EU-reform program under debt financing 
In order to ascertain the political feasibility of the EU-reform program, its ex-ante and ex-post 
acceptability should be evaluated. We now turn to this issue.  
4.1 Modern sector (ex-ante) 
In order the EU reform program be acceptable for the modern sector at the beginning of the reform 
period, the present value of the expected per capita consumption level should be at least as large 







M z q q R θ β θ γ θ β θ γ ) 1 ( ] [ ) 1 ( 2 1 1 ,
*
1 , + ≥ + + + − ,            (10) 
where β is the time-discount factor (the inverse of the time preference factor;  β=1/σ <1). The first 
term is the per-capita consumption level of the first period. The terms in the square brackets 
respectively  are  the  second  period  per-capita  income,  per-capita  interest  earnings,  and  the 
expected per capita extra gain from the EU accession. The right-hand side of the inequality shows 
the present value of the per-capita consumption level attained when the status quo kept intact.  11   




EU EU z q q
R
θ γ β 1 ,
2 1 * 1
− ≥ .                           (11) 
This is the ex-ante acceptable minimum level of the interest rate factor for the modern sector. As 
the burden of the transformation of the traditional sector (c+η) increases, that is as the saving rate 
(
EU
M 1 , γ ) increases and as the probability of a ‘yes’ from the EU (
EU q1 and 
EU q2 ) decreases the 
modern sector people demand a higher yield for the government’s debt instrument they hold. This 
is the impact of the uncertainty stemming from the ‘EU’s absorption capacity’ type arguments on 
the ex-ante acceptability of the EU reform program for the modern sector people. 
4.2 Modern sector (ex-post) 
Depending on the realization of the probabilities ex-post three cases can occur.14 The first two are; 
i)  0 1 =
EU q  and ii)  0   ; 1 2 1 = =
EU EU q q . They yield identical results. In these cases the ex-post 
acceptability condition, using Equation (11a) turns out to be 
β
1 * ≥ R .                      (11a) 
This is more stringent than Equation (11a). That is, if modern sector people ex-ante attach 
non-zero value for 
EU q1 and 
EU q2 , they can accept a lower interest rate (given by Equation (11)) 
than implied by Equation (11a). However, if the EU-reform process abruptly comes to an end due 
to a negative decision from the EU, then they will lose. Note that β is the inverse of the one plus the 
time preference factor. Hence this condition implies that the real interest rate on debt should be 
higher than the time preference factor.   
                                            
14 Since 
N q1 does not enter to Equation (11) we have only three cases to consider. 12   
The third case is:  1   ; 1 2 1 = =






θ γ β 1 ,
* 1
− ≥                     (11b) 
It  is  clear  that  the  right  hand  side  of  (11b)  gives  the  lower boundry  of the  minimum  ex-post 
acceptable level of interest rate for the modern sector. However, since ex ante 
EU q2  cannot be 
known by the modern sector, a higher interest rate will be demanded. This clearly puts an extra 
burden on the traditional sector.  
4.3 Traditional sector (ex-ante) 
The ex-ante acceptability condition for the traditional sector is 
{ } { } { }
. ) 1 ( )
1
)( 1 )( 1 (
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The right-hand side of the inequality shows the present value of the per-capita consumption level 
attained when the status quo kept intact. The first three curled parentheses are for the expected 
per-capita consumption levels attained at the first period, respectively when the EU reform program 
continues, suddenly halts and replaced by the national reform program, and suddenly halts and a 
reversal to the status quo occurs. Note that the per capita consumption level of the traditional 
sector in the first two cases is constrained by the unemployment payments (η). The last three 
curled parentheses show expected present value of the second period per-capita consumption 
levels with the same ordering of the events as represented by the first three curled parentheses. As 
in the EU reform program case the fourth curled parenthesis takes care of the impact of the final 13   
decision of the EU on the consumption level ( z q
EU
2 ). Finally, the per capita tax paid by the ex-
traditional sector people to finance the debt service of the government to the modern sector at the 
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T M z q q Q
R ,                      (13) 
where  ] ) 1 ( [ 1 1 1
N EU EU q q q Q − + = .  This  gives  the  ex-ante  acceptable  maximum  level  of  the 
interest rate factor for the traditional sector. Note that as the probability of a sudden stop increases 
(a low 
EU q1 ) this condition becomes more demanding, that is the acceptable maximum interest 
level decreases.15 
4.4 Traditional sector (ex-post) 
Now there are four cases to be considered. The first one is  0   ; 0 1 1 = =
N EU q q . By using 
Equation (13) this yields: 
  0
* ≤ R .                      (13a) 
That is if a sudden stop and a reversal to the status quo was certain, the traditional sector would 
not have accepted the EU-reform program at the outset. But, since such a certainty does not exist, 
if they attach a non-zero value for 
EU q1 and 
EU q2 , they can accept a positive interest rate and ex-
post will lose. 
                                            
15 Note that if the EU and national reform programs are economically efficient, provided that the 
real  interest  rate  is  greater  than  or  equal  to  the  time  preference  parameter,  then 
0 ] ) 1 ( [ > + − T M θ β βθ  (see the discussion in Appendix A1). In what follows it is assumed that 
this condition holds. In this case, the maximum value of the interest rate factor is greater than 
zero and hence the EU reform program is feasible for the traditional sector. 14   
The second case is:  1   ; 1 2 1 = =
EU EU q q . It is clear from Equation (13) that this case gives 
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R               (13b) 
However, since this is ex-ante not known, traditional sector will not accept higher interest rates 
than given by Equation (13) and this will narrow down the feasible interval of interest rates for the 
ex-ante political acceptability of the EU-reform program, which we discuss in the next section. 
The final two cases are i)  1   ; 0 1 1 = =
N EU q q  and ii)  0   ; 1 2 1 = =
EU EU q q . These yield: 
{ }
.













T M R                            (13c) 
Depending on the ex-ante attached values for 
EU q1 and 
EU q2 this may yield an interest rate factor 
which is greater or lower than or equal to the interest rate factor implied by Equation (13). This has 
obvious repercussions on the feasible set of interest rate factors.    
4.5 Political feasibility of the EU reform program 
Having shown the conditions to be met for the EU reform program to be accepted by each of the 
sectors,  the  question  that  should  be  answered  now  is  whether  there  is  a  set  of  minimum 
acceptable  interest  rate  factors  for  the  modern  sector  which  are  lower  than  the  maximum 
acceptable interest rate factors for the traditional sector. If this indeed is the case, then the EU 
reform program, Pareto dominates the status quo and therefore it is a “politically feasible reform 
program”.      15   
Consider Figure 2. For the modern sector, ex-ante acceptable minimum levels of interest 
rate factors corresponding to various values of z, when 
EU q1 and 
EU q2 are non-zero is shown by the 
downward sloping solid demarcation line (Me-Me). This line intersects the z-axis at point B. The 
upward sloping solid line is the demarcation line (Te-Te) for the ex-ante acceptable maximum levels 
of interest rate factors for the traditional sector when 
EU q1 and 
EU q2 or 
N q1 are non-zero. The two 
lines intersect at point A. In the appendix we show that zA < zB . Together with the upward slope of 
(Te-Te) and downward slope of (Me-Me), this suffices to prove that the EU reform program is ex-
ante acceptable by both of the sectors. That is, there is a set of minimum acceptable interest rate 
factors for the modern sector which are lower than the maximum acceptable interest rate factors 
for the traditional sector. The area between A, B, and C indicate this feasible region. However, note 
that the feasible region narrows as these probabilities take lower values (indicated by the area 
between the dashed demarcation lines and the associated arrows: the area between D, D1 and 
D2). 
 
       R*               
                        C       Te 
           Mp        Mp                       
1/βϴM                                  
     Me                    D1   
         A          D                    
             Te            Me                                   D2 
          0                   B                   z   
       Tp                                                            Tp             
                 
Figure 2: Interest rate factors acceptable for both sectors in the EU reform program 
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When 
EU q1 , 
EU q2 and 
N q1 are zero and this fact is known a-priori, no positive interest rate 
simultaneously satisfies acceptability conditions for both sectors. Therefore the EU reform program 
is not, ex ante, politically feasible. However, when both sectors attach a non-zero value to these 
probabilities and accept the EU reform program ex-ante, but a sudden stop occurs ex-post, they 
both lose. Ex-post acceptable levels of interest rate factors corresponding to this case are shown 
by the horizontal lines Mp-Mp (the minimum level of interest rate factor for the modern sector) and 
Tp-Tp  (the  maximum  level  of  interest rate factor  for  the  traditional  sector) and  the  associated 
arrows. As clear from these demarcation lines and the associated arrows, the EU program is not 
feasible under these conditions. Note that there is a threshold level for the level of per capita extra 
gain from the EU accession (zA), below which the EU reform program is not politically feasible. 
Assuming a given z, the higher this threshold level, the smaller is the feasible region.  
5. Political Feasibility of the national reform program under debt financing 
In this section the problem of political feasibility (as defined in footnote 3) of the national reform 
program  is  discussed  with  reference  to  the  acceptability  conditions  for  the  modern  and  the 
traditional sectors. 
5.1 Modern sector 
In the national reform program, by construction, there is no uncertainty. The acceptability condition 
for the modern sector is given by 
, ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ,
*
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where the terms in the parentheses on the left-hand side show the present values of the per-capita 
consumption level in the modern sector in the first and second periods, respectively. The second 




M R θ γ shows the gross return as of the beginning of the 17   
second period on the government securities held by each of the modern sector.  The right hand 
side is for the present value of the status quo per-capita consumption level. Rearranging gives the 
following condition16 
β
1 * ≥ R .                        (15) 
5.2 Traditional sector 
For the national reform program to be accepted by the traditional sector the present value of the 
certain per-capita consumption in this sector under the reform should be at least as much as the 
present value of the per-capita consumption in the status quo:  
. ) 1 (
1















λ θ γ β
θ δ β θ βδ θ δ η δ + ≥
−
− − + + − +         (16) 
Note that, as discussed in the second section, we assumed that working hours of the 
traditional sector can be restricted, which effectively means that only a percentage (
N δ ) of the 
labor force ( 1 0 ≤ <
N δ ) of the traditional sector becomes unemployed in the national reform 
program and receive unemployment benefit. The first term shows this benefit to each people in the 
traditional sector. Those that remained in the traditional sector have still access to the status quo 
level of income and therefore the same level of consumption; i.e. the second term. The third and 
fourth terms are the present values of the corresponding levels of consumption in the second 
period. The last term on the left-hand side shows the present value of the per-capita taxes paid by 
the ex-traditional sector people to finance the debt issued by the government and held by the 
modern sector people. Rearranging Equation (16) yields the ex-ante acceptable maximum level of 
the interest rate factor for the traditional sector; 
                                            
16 Note that this condition simply restates the well known equilibrium condition, i.e. the rate of 
interest should be at least as high as the rate of time preference. 18   
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5.3 Political feasibility of the national reform program 
The feasible set of interest rate factors which is acceptable to both of the sectors is shown in 
Figure 3. In the horizontal axis, now we have η –the reform period per capita unemployment benefit 
for the traditional sector. The horizontal demarcation line labeled as R*min shows the acceptable 
minimum level of the interest rate factor by the modern sector. The upward sloping demarcation 
line  labeled  as  R*max  indicates  the  acceptable  maximum  level  of  interest  rate  factor  for  the 
traditional sector. The feasible set of interest rate factors which is acceptable for both of the sectors 
is the area between point A and the parts of R*max and R*min lines which are respectively at the 
north-east and east of point A. The proof of the existence of this feasible set is straightforward: 
R*min>0. The R*max demarcation line is upward sloping and ηB<0. These properties suffice to the 
existence for a feasible set of interest rate factors. The region in the R*max A R*min  triangle gives the 
set of politically feasible combinations of R and η. 
            R*max   
      R*               
                                
                                     
      1/β             A                                R*min 
                            
                   
         C    
B        0                                       η   
                                                                         
               
Figure 3: Interest rate factors acceptable for both sectors in the national reform program 
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6. Debt financing: the EU or the national reform program? 
Having shown under which conditions both of the reform programs are politically feasible, i.e. 
Pareto dominate the status quo, it is now the time to discuss the choice between the EU and the 
national reform programs. To do so, we compare per-capita consumption levels. 
6.1 Modern sector (Ex-ante) 
The expected present value of the per capita consumption level as of the beginning of the EU-
reform program ( ) (
EU
M c E ) is given by the left hand-side of Equation (10). The left hand-side of 
Equation (14) gives the present value of the per capita consumption level as of the beginning of the 
national  reform  program  (
N
M c ), which  is  certain.  Subtracting 
N
M c from  ) (
EU
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N = δ  and  0 1 =
EU q  or  1
N = δ  and  0 2 =
EU q . Note 
that, unless  1
N = δ , even  0 1 =
EU q  or  0 2 =
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6.2 Traditional sector (Ex-ante) 
Re-arranging the left hand-side of Equation (12) one obtains the following expected present value 
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The present value of the per capita consumption as of the beginning of the national reform program 
is given by the left-hand side of Equation (16). Subtracting this term from Equation (19) after some 
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        (20) 
The dominance of one of the reform programs to the other for the traditional sector people 
depends on the values that probabilities in Equation (20) can take. In the appendix we show that 
when  0 1 1 = =




T c E c > . 
Otherwise EU program outperforms the national program. 
These results show that if, ex-ante, the ‘EU’s absorption capacity’ type arguments lead to 
perceptions that a sudden stop of the EU-reform process and accommodating decrease of desire 
to continue with national reform program is highly likely, then the traditional sector will oppose to 
the implementation of the EU-reform program. However, unless  1
N = δ , the modern sector always 
prefers the EU reform program. 
6.3 Ex-post comparison 




M c c E = ) ( only when there is full reform in the national program 
( 1
N = δ ) and a ‘no’ from the EU is received during the reform phase or at the beginning of the 
second period. It is obvious that, ex-post, modern sector is never worse-off by ex-ante preferring 
the EU reform program. However, this is not the case for the traditional sector. If by associating a 
sufficiently high positive probability for a ‘yes’ from the EU and select to go with the EU program 
ex-ante, but face an ex-post rejection, then traditional sector will lose. As discussed above, this can 
jeopardize the continuation of the EU reform program, since the traditional sector will try to block it. 21   
On the other hand, if the traditional sector, ex ante, does not accept the EU reform program by 
perceiving a very low probability for a ‘yes’ from the EU, depending on its political power, it may 
enforce the government to shy away from EU reforms. Obviously this outcome will not be welcome 
by the modern sector, which always benefits from the EU reform program. 
7. Political feasibility under tax financing 
As discussed in the third section, tax financing alternative is only valid for the EU-reform program. 
The ex-ante acceptability conditions can easily be obtained from Equation (11) for the modern 
sector and from Equation (13) for the traditional sector, replacing 
EU
M 1 , γ  by the required tax rate 
(
EU
M 1 , τ   )  and  noting  that  since  there  is  no  debt  instrument  issued  by  the  government  R*=0. 
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and for the traditional sector the acceptability condition turns out to be: 
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z .              (22) 
Equation  (22)  clearly  indicates  that  since  the  term  in  the  second  square  brackets  is 
positive, the ex-ante acceptability condition is not binding for the traditional sector. This means that, 
provided that the modern sector ex-ante acceptability condition given by Equation (21) is satisfied, 
then the EU-reform program is ex-ante politically feasible . 
However, if the modern sector attach a low probability to the continuation of the EU reform 
program or to a final ‘yes’ from the EU, they demand a very high value for z. This means that under 
these conditions the ex-ante acceptability of the EU reform has a very low chance, simply because 
there is certainly an upper bound to z. Note further that even the probability of a sudden stop is low 22   
the modern sector can reject the EU reform program ex-ante. This will arise if they perceive that 
the probability of receiving a final ‘yes’ from the EU is very low. Hence, the ‘EU’s absorption 
capacity’ type arguments, ex ante, can lead modern sector people to resist to the EU reform 
program. 
Note that the ex-ante acceptability condition for the modern sector in this case is more 
demanding than the debt  financing case (compare  Equation (21) with Equation (11)). Ex-post 
results are also different: If, ex-post  0 1 =
EU q  or  0 2 =
EU q , the EU-reform program will not be 
accepted by the modern sector: As indicated by Equation (21), under these conditions, the required 
level of z goes to infinity. 
8. Conclusion 
The short answer to the question in the title of the paper is a qualified “yes”.  To show this, 
we abstract from other type of uncertainties associated with reform programs which have been well 
documented in the literature and instead focus only on uncertainties arising from arguments based 
on “EUs absorption capacity” type arguments. 
In our framework it is assumed that Turkey will have some extra benefits if and when the 
country joins the EU. Under acceptability conditions such an outcome is shown to Pareto dominate 
the  national  reform  and  status  quo  alternatives.  However,  this  result  crucially  depends  on  an 
exogenous factor, namely, EU’s decision to accept Turkey as a member state. It is shown that the 
uncertainties stemming from the ‘EU’s absorption capacity’ type arguments can jeopardize the ex-
ante and ex-post political feasibility of the EU reform program and diminish the significance of its 
Pareto dominance vis-à-vis other alternatives. 23   
The  program  is  ex  ante  politically  infeasible  if  EU’s  declaration  of  accepting  Turkey’s 
membership before its start is perceived as less likely. It is shown that, in this case, the traditional 
sector will oppose and try to block the EU reform process. However, if this perception is wrong and 
the true probability of a ‘yes’ is high, a reform program which if implemented would have been in 
the interests of both of the sectors ex-post, will not be implemented. This is a clear loss of welfare 
for people leaving in both sectors, since reformers could have started with the national reform 
alternative, which is also welfare improving and free of such uncertainties.17 
Ex-post  infeasibility,  in  this  context,  means  that  the  rejection  of  Turkey’s  membership 
before  the  start  of  the  reform  program  is  perceived  as  less  likely,  but,  at  the  midst  of  the 
implementation phase it turns out to be the case. Ex-post resistance to the EU reform program 
occurs since both of the modern and traditional sectors suddenly find themselves in a position that 
they should have not politically accepted ex-ante. Then the country is left with two options, namely 
switching to national reform strategy or going back to status quo. If conditions for political feasibility 




                                            
17  If  / λ > 1 2 ,  such  an  outcome  can  be  avoided  through  democratic  mechanism.  EU  reform 
program is at least as preferable as the other two alternatives for the modern sector. If the people 
affiliated  with  the  modern  sector  constitute  the  majority,  then  the  chance  of  getting  popular 
support for adopting EU reform program in a single issue referendum will be high. In order to 
implement  such  a  proposal  it  is  clear  that  it  should  be  accompanied  by  a  contingent 
compensation scheme. 
18 When the acceptability condition is satisfied in one sector but not in the other, the policy maker 
again may resort to a referendum. The outcome, again, will depend on which sector constitutes 
the majority and whether some kind of compensation can be given to those who will be negatively 
affected, in order to prevent a social conflict.  24   
Appendix 
A1. Economic efficiency 
Both of the reform programs should be economically efficient to be implemented. That is, 
the present value of the total income as of the beginning of the reform period should be more than 
that of the no reform case:  
o Y Y Y ) 1 ( 2 1 ρ ρ + > +                                    (A1) 
where 
* / 1 R = ρ , Y0 is income obtained under the status quo, Y1 and Y2 are respectively the first 
and second period incomes attained when the relevant reform program is implemented. For the 
national reform program:   
T M Y θ λ λθ ) 1 ( 0 − + = , 
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Substituting these incomes in Equation (A1) and simplifying gives the following economic efficiency 
condition for the national sector: 
0 ) 1 ( > + − T M θ ρ ρθ .                     (A2) 
In Section 4.1 we mentioned that the time preference parameter (σ) is the inverse of the time-
discount factor (β). If the national reform program is economically efficient, that is condition given 
by Equation (A2) holds, then when ρ<β (when r*>σ):  0 ] ) 1 ( [ > + − T M θ β βθ . That is if the real 
interest rate is greater than the patience level of the economic agents the term in the square 
brackets is always positive. Note that we encountered this term in Equations (13, 13b, 13c, 17, 24) 
when we discussed political acceptability and feasibility of the reforms. 
The economic efficiency condition for the EU reform program is less demanding. For this 
case Y1 and Y2 are given by 
M Y λθ = 1 ;  z q q Y
EU EU
M 2 1 2 + =θ . 25   
Note  that the  reform  planners,  in  calculating the  economic  efficiency,  should  take  the 
uncertainty arising from the ‘too big to absorb’ type arguments into consideration. That is why the 
relevant probabilities enter to Y2. Substituting these terms in Equation (A1) we obtain 
0 ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 2 1 > + + − − z q q
EU EU
T M ρ θ ρ ρθ λ .                (A3) 
A2. Proof of the existence of the feasibility of the EU reform program 
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At the point of intersection of the two demarcation lines (Me-Me) and (Te-Te), that is at point A, 
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Since  1 0 < < λ  and the term in the curled parenthesis is positive,   B A z z < . 
A3.  National  reform  program  can  outperform  the EU  reform  program  for  the  traditional 
sector 
We consider four limiting cases. The first one is  1   ; 1 2 1 = =
EU EU q q . Substituting these values in 













λ θ γ β










− + − + − = − .
1
] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( ) (
1 ,
*
        (A6) 
We know from the political acceptability condition that for the national program to be politically 
acceptable for the traditional sector the term in the curled parenthesis should be positive (see 
Equation (17)). Hence, the EU program outperforms the national program. 26   
The second case is  0 1 1 = =
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c c E           (A7) 
In this case, for the traditional sector, the national program outperforms the EU program. 
The third case is  1   , 0 1 1 = =
N EU q q . In this case the last term in Equation (A6) vanishes, 
but still the right-hand side is positive and the traditional sector prefers the EU program. 
The fourth case is  1 0   , 1 0 2 < < < <
EU q Q . Consider the right-hand side of Equation (20). 
If 
N Q δ < , the first two terms are negative (note that the term in the curled parenthesis is positive. 
Hence  sufficiently  low  values  of 
EU q1 and 




T c c E < ) ( and  consequently  the 
national program will be preferred.    
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